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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JARED LOOSER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, THE STATE INSURANCE 
FUND and SPORTS CARS INCOR-
PORATED, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8972 
We agree with the first sentence in the Plaintiff's 
Brief, namely the happening of the accident and the injury 
of plaintiff on May 25, 1957. But we think that most of 
the other purported statements of the facts, as set out in 
his attorneys' brief, are not complete and correct. For ex-
ample, the second sentence in the brief (page 1), that 
"plaintiff was employed as a mechanic and test driver by 
the defendant, Sports Cars Incorporated," is only partially 
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correct. Plaintiff was emloyed as a mechanic. He was not 
employed as a test driver. Their Statement of Facts has 
many inferences and arguments intermixed with the facts 
' and several of the stated facts are only partially correct. 
We therefore feel that we must here make a brief statement 
of the essential facts, without any inferences or arguments. 
Jared Looser, the plaintiff, was in the employ of Sports 
Cars Incorporated as a mechanic. During the months of 
April and May 1957, there was considerable conversation 
on the premises of Sports Cars Incorporated among employ-
ees of that company, relating to the sports car races which 
were going to be run during the latter part of May and the 
first part of June, 1957. From the transcript of testimony 
of the Industrial Commission's hearing of May 26, 1958, it 
is quite apparent that the witnesses could not all remember 
in exactly the same way, how many conversations there 
were or the exact words of each person. Some of these con-
versations culminated in an arrangement whereby Jared 
Looser and Vaughn Funk drove the MG from Salt Lake 
City to LaJunta, Colorado on May 24, 1957 to participate 
as contestants in the races which were to be held at LaJunta 
on May 25 and 26, under the auspices of Sports Car Club 
of America. This MG was a used car which was owned by 
Sports Cars Incorporated and had been assigned to Vaughn 
Funk as a demonstrator in his work as salesman for the 
company. Mr. Funk held the position of Secretary of the 
company and salesman. He was not connected with the 
mechanical part of the business. He was interested in sports 
car racing as a hobby. Pursuant to a conversation in the 
shop one day between Jared Looser and Vaughn Funk, it 
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was agreed that Jared Looser would put in his own time 
preparing this car for the LaJunta races; then both Looser 
and Funk would drive it in the races. At their request Mr. 
Schettler, the president of the company, agreed that the 
company would pay for the parts that were necessary to 
prepare the car for the races. Looser and Funk each paid 
his own entrance fee of $7.50. Looser put in 50 hours. of 
his own time working on the car. Funk helped a little. Funk 
paid for the gasoline and oil out of his own pocket. Each 
of them paid for their own meals on the trip. While driving 
the car in a practice run prior to the races, Jared Looser 
was injured. 
The Industrial Commission held a hearing relating to 
Jared Looser's application for compensation. On August 
1, 1958 the Commission rendered its decision in which it 
denied his application. Plaintiff and his attorneys have 
brought the matter to ths Court for review. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT 
REQUIRED TO FIND OR CONCLUDE THAT 
JARED LOOSER'S ACCIDENT OF MAY 25 
' 1957, AROSE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE 
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
POINT II. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID MAKE 
WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW. 
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POINT III. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT 
REQUIRED TO GRANT APPLICANT'S RE-
QUEST FOR A REHEARING. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT 
REQUIRED TO FIND OR CONCLUDE THAT 
JARED LOOSER'S ACCIDENT OF MAY 25, 
1957, AROSE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE 
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
It is now well settled that in an Industrial Commission 
case the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish 
a claim for compensation. Grasteit vs. Ind. Comm., 76 Utah 
487, 290 Pac. 764, Wherritt vs. Ind. Comm., 100 Utah 68, 
110 Pac. (2nd) 374, General Mills, Inc. vs. Ind. Comm., 101 
Utah 214, 120 Pac. (2nd) 379. 
We think that the Supreme Court of Utah has already 
settled the law relating to factual situations such as that 
which existed in the case at bar. In Auerbach Company 
vs. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 347, 195 Pac. (2nd) 
245, the injured person, Rela Wardle was in the employ 
of Auerbach Company as a cashier. She also played basket-
ball, being a member of a team sponsored by the Company 
as a part of their public relations and advertising program. 
She had not been hired as a basketball player. She was 
paid only as a cashier. The expenses of herself and all the 
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other members of the team, were paid during their trips 
to play basketball. Miss Wardle played on the basketball 
team because she wanted to, and not because she was re-
quired to do so. Some of the players were in the employ of 
Auerbach Company, and some were not. Any income from 
the games went to the Company, but in amount it was 
hardly sufficient to keep up with the team expenses. The 
control of the team was in the hands of the public relations 
officer of the Company. Rela Wardle was injured at night 
while she was riding in an automobile going to Provo to 
play a game. The car was being driven by a Miss Green, 
who was not an employee of Auerbach's, but the Company 
was furnishing the gasoline for the trip. 
After a hearing, the Industrial Commission held that 
Miss Wardle was in the course of her employment and 
awarded compensation. By a unanimous decision, the Su-
preme Court of Utah ·annulled the award. In the Court's 
main opinion and in the two concurring opinions, it was 
held that one of the most important elements of the em-
ployer-employee relationship was missing, namely "the right 
to control." Justice Pratt said, 
"Right to control in this case does not mean 
merely coaching control, the purpose of which is to 
produce team work when the alleged employee plays; 
but means the right to require performance of a 
duty to play, if such a duty exists." 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Wade said, 
"The company encouraged the girls to play 
basketball, it furnished certain expenses including 
transportation, its department of public relations 
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arranged some of the games and some of the details 
connected therewith, it collected the gate receipts 
and obtained certain advertisement advantages from 
the games. In my opinion this is not sufficient from 
which a contract of employment vesting in the com-
pany the right of control over the members of this 
team can reasonably be inferred." 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Wolfe said, 
"The test of the employer-employee relationship 
is not whether or not the purported employer is bene-
fited by the actions of the purported employee. A 
person or business organization may be materially 
benefited by an independent contractor, or by a vol-
unteer. It is obvious that regardless of whether or 
not the prime motive in sponsoring a team is to reap 
the benefits of the advertising thereby attained, all 
sponsors will receive, either as a direct or incidental 
benefit, advertising benefits to the extent that games 
played by their teams are patronized by the 'fans,' 
and to the extent that results and reports of such 
games are publicized in the newspapers and on the 
radio. But whether the chief purpose of the sponsor 
is advertising, or some more philanthropic motive, I 
regard as immaterial here. As noted in the prevail-
ing opinion, the fundamental test of employer-em-
ployee relationship is right of control. And where 
the player plays voluntarily, of his own choice, dur-
ing his off-duty hours, and is free to play or not to 
play as he determines of his own choice, it cannot 
be said that the sponsor has the right of control 
which makes it an employer and the player an em-
ployee, within the meaning of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act." 
There have been two cases decided by the Supreme 
Court of Utah involving the question of whether racing car 
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drivers were in the status of employees, namely Intermoun-
tain Speedways, Inc. vs. Industrial Commission, 101 Utah 
573, 126 Pac. (2nd) 22, and another case having the same 
title, at 102 Utah 126, 127 Pac. (2nd) 1045. The majority 
opinion of the Court held that the racing car drivers were 
not employees of the company which operated the races. 
This, of course, was a diffe-rent question than is involved 
in the case at bar. Most of the Court's discussion of the 
points involved, is contained in the opinion of the first of 
the two cases at 101 Utah 573. The Court discussed certain 
tests which must be applied to any situation to determine 
whether the relationship of "employer-employee" exists, 
such as: 
( 1) The method of payment. 
(2) Nature of the work. 
( 3) Whether for a definite piece of work. 
But the Court's opinion held that the one test which is more 
important than the others is the "right to control as to 
means and method of performance." The Court's opinion 
further stated (p. 578-579) that 
"Speedways had no right to control Winters as 
to the means or method of performance in the race. 
* * * The deceased in this case did not bear the 
relation of employee to Intermountain Speedways. 
He was a contestant with other contestants." 
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POINT II. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID MAKE 
WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Plaintiff's attorneys have charged that the Industrial 
Commission failed to make findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in writing, as is required by Section 35-1-85, U. C. A. 
1953. The Industrial Commission did make its findings of 
fact and its conclusions of law in writing. In its Decision 
dated August 1, 1958, the Commission first specified the 
formal and preliminary matters in the title and in the first 
three paragraphs. Then, the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law are set out in the next four paragraphs as 
follows: 
"Applicant was employed as a mechanic by 
Sports Cars Incorporated. He had not been separated 
from the payroll at the time the accident occurred. 
However, it does not follow that the activity in which 
applicant was engaged at the time of the accident 
was in his capacity of employee. 
"Mr. Schettler, president of defendant corpora-
tion, on request of applicant and Funk, consented 
that a company car could be conditioned for races 
at LaJunta, Colorado, if applicant and Funk, per-
haps others, did all the work free of charge. Sports 
Car Incorporated would supply the necessary parts 
free of charge. Neither applicant nor Funk received 
wages from the time they left Salt Lake City until 
their return. Each paid his own living expenses and 
the gas and oil. There is no evidence to support a 
finding that Sports Car Incorporated had the right 
to control applicant after he left Salt Lake City and 
until his return. No doubt Schettler could have re-
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fused to let applicant and Funk use the car but that 
is not the kind of control with which we are con-
cerned. \ 
"We are persuaded to hold that both applicant 
and Funk were on a mission of their own choosing 
as contestants to obtain experience in racing and for 
their own enjoyment. Such relationship as may have 
existed between applicant, Funk and Sports Cars 
Incorporated, could be called a joint enterprise, but 
not an employer-employee relationship. Defendant 
corporation supplied the car and the necessary parts 
free of charge. Applicant and Funk supplied the 
labor free of charge. Defendant corporation possibly 
received some advertising value. Applicant and Funk 
obtained race driving experience and enjoyment. 
"In any event, whether applicant and Funk were 
on a mission of their own or engaged in a joint en-
terprise with defendant corporation, we must find 
that the accident did not arise out of or in the course 
of applicant's employment by defendant corpora-
tion." 
It is true that the Industrial Commission did not label 
the FINDINGS OF FACT by putting those three words in 
the middle of the page immediately preceding the fourth 
paragraph of the Decision, as is usually done in the papers 
filed in the District Court in a civil case prior to entering 
a Judgment. But there is no requirement in Section 35-1-85 
that the findings of fact or the conclusions of law must be 
in any particular form or be specifically designated with 
those titles prior to the issuance of the Decision or in the 
Decision itself. We are also aware that the Commission 
included a few surplus words in its. findings and conclusions, 
particularly in giving its reasons for so finding or so con-
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eluding. But the provision in Section 35-1-85 does not pro-
hibit the Commissiom from giving its reasons for arriving 
at certain conclusions. 
Stripped of surplus words, the Commission's findings 
of fact were that 
(1) Jared Looser regularly was in the employ of De-
fendant, Sports Cars, Inc., as a mechanic; 
(2) the corporation's president Schettler allowed a 
company car to be conditioned for races at 
LaJ unta, under arrangements whereby the com-
pany supplied the necessary parts and the men 
supplied the labor; 
( 3) Looser and Funk did not receive wages from the 
time of leaving Salt Lake City until their return; 
( 4) each of them paid his own expenses; 
( 5) the corporation did not have the right to control 
Looser after he left Salt Lake City ; 
(6) at the time of his accident Looser did not have 
the relationship of employee; 
(7) Looser and Funk supplied their labor and they 
received driving experience and enjoyment; 
(8) the corporation possibly received some advertising 
value. 
The Commission's conclusion of law was that the 
accident did not arise out of or in the course of Looser's 
employment. Those findings and conclusions are quite clear 
and are complete. 
There have been very few cases in which the Supreme 
Court of Utah has discussed the requirement of Section 
35-1-85, U. C. A. 1953, that the Industrial Commission shall 
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make written findings of fact and conclusions of law, since 
that provision was enacted by the 1949 Legislature. But 
this Court has on previous occasions ruled on the require-
ment that the District Courts make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
In re Clift's Estate, 70 Utah 409, 290 Pac. 859, this 
Court held that even though the District Court's findings 
are not in artistic form according to approved models, but 
they clearly indicate the mind of the trial court, the Su-
preme Court will hold without merit the assignments of 
error as to such findings. 
In the case of Consolidated Wagon & Machine Co. vs. 
Kay, 81 Utah 595, 21 Pac. (2nd) 836, the following syllabi 
are instructive: 
( 5) In making findings Court must find on all mater-
ial issues. 
( 6) Findings are required only as to ultimate facts, 
not necessarily as to all specifically alleged facts 
involved in findings of ultimate facts. 
( 8) Statutory requirement that facts found and con-
clusions of law be separately stated is merely di-
rectory. 
(10) Finding, though stated among conclusions of 
law, may be regarded as finding of ultimate fact. 
In the 1933 case of Thompson vs. Ind. Comm., 82 Utah 
247, 23 Pac. (2nd) 930, the Supreme Court held that an 
Industrial Commission finding that "the applicant failed 
to sustain his burden of proof by competent evidence that 
injury was the result of accident in course of his employ-
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ment," was equivalent to a finding that applicant did not 
sustain an injury by accident arising out of or in course 
of his employment. 
In the more recent case of Smith vs. Industrial Com-
mission, 5 Utah (2nd) 50, 296 Pac. (2nd) 511, Roland B. 
Smith was killed in the crash of a private airplane on April 
19, 1954. He was a general partner in a partnership busi-
ness known as Smith Sales Company, which sold the prod-
ucts of four corporations which packed or canned foods. 
Mr. Smith was an officer of each of those corporations. 
The partnership had no workmen's compensation insurance 
coverage. The corporations had coverage. A claim was 
made by Mr. Smith's dependents against the corporations 
and their insurance carrier. After a hearing, the Industrial 
Commission denied the claim. One of the Commission's 
findings was that at the time of his death Smith was en-
gaged in his capacity of a general partner in the Smith Sales 
Company. The Commission further stated "It necessarily 
must follow that the trip was for and on behalf of the part-
nership * * *" 
The Supreme Court of Utah sustained the Industrial 
Commission's order. The Court held that there was ample 
evidence to support the Commission's finding that Smith 
"was engaged in his capacity of general partner." Plain-
tiffs' attorneys contended that the findings were incom-
plete in that the Commission failed to make a finding that 
Smith was not at the time in question representing one or 
more of the corporations. The Court's opinion said, 
"It was not his duty as representative of any 
corporation to promote sales; that was his duty as 
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a general partner. * * * It would seem that a 
positive finding that Smith was representing the 
partnership would under the facts in this case nec-
essarily preclude a finding that he was also engaged 
in corporate work. It would be clearer had the Com-
mission spelled out the negative-that Smith was 
not representing any of the corporations on this trip. 
The affirmative finding that he was engaged in his 
capacity of a general partner of Smith Sales Com-
pany carries with it the conclusion that he was not 
engaged in his capacity of an employee or officer of 
one or more of the corporations. * * * The 
order of the Commission could only follow their con-
clusion that the finding that Smith was engaged in 
his capacity of general partner in the Smith Sales 
Company was a finding that he was not engaged in 
his capacity of corporate employee or officer." 
Section 35-1-88 of the Workmen's Compensation Law 
reads: 
"The commission shall not be bound by the usual 
common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any 
technical or formal rules of procedure, other than 
as herein provided; but may make its investigations 
in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated 
to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and 
to carry out justly the spirit of this title." 
In the case of Spencer vs. Ind. Comm., 81 Utah 511, 20 
Pac. (2nd) 618, there was considerable discussion about 
the Industrial Commission's procedure. The Supreme 
Court's opinion contains the following: 
"A broad discretion is vested in the Indus trial 
Commission by statute (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 
3149) with respect to the manner in which its in-
vestigations shall be conducted. Unless it is shown 
that some substantial right of a party has been de-
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nied him, or that he has been deprived of an oppor-
tunity to fairly and fully develop his case, this court 
will not interfere to direct the method of conducting 
such hearings or investigations. (Ocean Ace. & 
Guar. Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 66 Utah 600, 245 Pac. 
343.)" 
In our present case, Jared Looser had been hired by 
Sports Cars, Inc., as a mechanic and worked as a mechanic. 
He was not hired to engage in races. He had never entered 
or driven in a race before. He voluntarily put in 50 hours 
of work on his own time preparing the car for the race 
because he expected to get some fun or enjoyment out of 
going to and participating in the races as a driver. His 
employer did not instruct or direct him with respect to his 
trip or his driving. 
Vaughn Funk also was in the same status at LaJunta 
as was Mr. Looser. He told Looser on one occasion that 
he should slow down so as not to give their competitors any 
secret about their speed capabilities. Mr. Funk was merely 
giving his fellow contestant some advice. He was more ex-
perienced than Looser. Mr. Funk might even be considered 
as being in the category of "coach" of the team consisting 
of Funk & Looser. His suggestion to Looser to slow down 
was more in the nature of advice than it was supervision. 
POINT III. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT 
REQUIRED TO GRANT APPLICANT'S RE-
QUEST FOR A REHEARING. 
The only necessary words which were contained in the 
Industrial Commission's Order dated September 30, 1958 
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were the last sentence in which it was "ORDERED that 
the Application for Rehearing is hereby denied." 
Section 35-1-82, U. C. A. 1953, provides that any party 
may apply to the Industrial Commission for a rehearing 
within 30 days after the Commission's decision. But neither 
this section nor Section 35-1-83 specify the wording or 
form of the order whereby the Commission denies the ap-
plication for rehearing. Neither these sections of the stat-
ute nor any ruling by the Utah Supreme Court of which 
we are cognizant, say anything more than that the Com-
mission denies the application for rehearing. In the present 
case the Industrial Commission gave its reasons for deny-
ing the application for rehearing, mainly that the Com-
mission had not been persuaded by the contents of the first 
Application for Rehearing nor of the First or Second Sup-
plements which were filed by applicant's attorneys, that 
the applicant was entitled to a rehearing. 
There is no provision in the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, nor in any other statutory or judicial rules, which re-
quired the Industrial Commission to grant a rehearing 
under circumstances such as those existing in this case at 
the time the Industrial Commission made its Order of 
September 30, 1958. In the preliminary material in that 
Order, the Industrial Commission mentioned that there is 
no provision in law for the filing of any Supplements to the 
application for rehearing. But in denying said application, 
the Commission's Order of September 30, 1958 showed that 
the Commission had given consideration to the material 
contained in the Supplements, as well as the material in the 
Petition for Rehearing. 
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There have been several Utah Supeme Court cases 
which mentioned that the Industrial Commission has the 
discretionary power to grant or deny a rehearing. In the 
case of Callahan vs. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 256, 
139 Pac. (2nd) 214, Marlow Callahan was given a hearing 
by the Industrial Commission, which then denied compen-
sation on the basis that he had not sustained "an accident, 
resulting in a hernia, arising out of or in the course of his 
employment." On July 13, 1942 applicant filed an appli-
cation for rehearing on the basis of alleged "newly discov-
ered evidence." On July 16, 1942 the Commission denied 
this application for rehearing. On August 13, 1942 appli-
cant filed with the Industrial Commission a "Supplemental 
Application for Rehearing," with three affidavits attached, 
one by himself, one by his attending physician and one by 
a fellow employee. The Industrial Commission took no ac-
tion regarding the "Supplemental Application." The appli-
cant took the case to the Utah Supreme Court for review. 
The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the In-
dustrial Commission's decision. The Court's opinion said, 
"This Supplemental Application was simply a second ap-
plication for rehearing, for which there is no authority in 
law. The statute above quoted is jurisdictional, and the 
Commission was warranted in disregarding this untimely 
"Supplemental Application." With respect to the Industrial 
Commission's discretion relating to the application for re-
hearing, the Court's opinion said 
"Regardless of whether we might feel that, un-
der the unfortunate circumstances of plaintiff ap-
pearing at the hearing without counsel or other 
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representation, and being unprepared to properly 
present his case at that time, the showing made 
through counsel by his application for a rehearing 
for a more thorough examination of available evi-
dence, the Commission found as a fact on the con-
flicting testimony in the record that plaintiff 'did 
not sustain an accident, resulting in a hernia, arising 
out of or in the course of his employment.' The 
Commision having so acted, on substantial, compe-
tent evidence, we cannot say as a matter of law that 
the decision should have been otherwise. This prin-
ciple has been repeatedly announced in Industrial 
Commission cases." 
With respect to the allegation of plaintiff's attorneys 
that the Industrial Commission refused to grant their 
Motion to be allowed time to file a Memorandum countering 
the Memorandum which Defendants' attorney had filed 
with the Industrial Commission on September 29, 1958: 
The Commission's Order denying the application for 
rehearing, was dated September 30, 1958. That was before 
the Commission received the Motion of plaintiff's attorneys 
on October 1, 1958. 
As with several other matters of the procedure involved 
in this case, there is no statutory provision relating to any 
memorandum or briefs which may be filed with the In-
dustrial Commission by either party to a proceeding pending 
before the Commission. Of course, the purpose any party 
has in filing such a memorandum is to persuade the Com-
mission to make a decision or ruling in favor of such party. 
There is no requirement that the Industrial Commission 
shall grant or specify a period for any party to file an argu-
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ment relating to a case the Commission may be considering. 
We do know that as a customary practice the Industrial 
Commission always has received written arguments from 
parties who have filed them in a reasonable time, and has 
given due consideration to them. After the Industrial Com-
mission rendered its Decision in this case on August 1, 
1958, the Applicant's attorneys filed first, an Application 
for Rehearing, then a Supplement to Pending Application 
for Rehearing. Both of those documents contained several 
allegations and points of argument. They were as much 
in the nature of a brief or memorandum as if they had 
been so labeled. We felt that it was only fitting and proper 
to file a memorandum with the Industrial Commission in 
the nature of argument against the arguments which the 
applicant's attorneys had already filed, lest we give the 
impression (by remaining silent) that we agreed with ap-
plicant's attorneys' arguments. 
We do not understand why plaintiff's attorneys (at 
page 25 of their brief), cited the case of Kent vs. Ind. Comm., 
89 Utah 381, 57 Pac. (2nd) 724. It does not support their 
arguments. In that case Charles Kent applied to the In-
dustrial Commission, which after a hearing, denied his 
claim. Mr. Kent then took the case to the Supreme Court. 
The Court sustained the Industrial Commission's decision. 
At pages 384 and 385 of the Court's opinion is found the 
following language : 
"When the Industrial Commission denies com-
pensation and the case is brought to this court for 
review, a different type of search of the record is 
demanded than when the Industrial Commission 
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makes an award of compensation and the record is 
likewise brought here for review. 
"In the case of denial of compensation, the rec-
ord must disclose that there is material, substantial, 
competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to 
make a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as a 
matter of law, that the Industrial Commission arbi-
trarily and capriciously disregarded the evidence or 
unreasonably refused to believe such evidence. See 
Kavalinakis vs. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 174, 
246 P. 698, and Gagos vs. Industrial Commission, 
87 Utah 101, 48 P. (2d) 449, 450. 
"In case of an award of compensation, all the 
record is required to disclose is that there is suffi-
cient, competent, material evidence in the record to 
support the award. That there is a conflict in the 
evidence, or that this court might or would have 
found differently had the evidence been submitted 
to it as a trier of the facts, is of no consequence. The 
Industrial Commission is a fact-finding body, and 
in case there is any substantial evidence to support 
its findings, its findings are conclusive upon this 
court and may not be distributed. Utah-Idaho Cen-
tral R. Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 490, 
267 P. 785." 
We also do not understand why plaintiff's attorneys 
cited the case of Miner vs. Ind. Comm., 202 Pac. (2nd) 557, 
115 Utah 88, at page 13 of their brief. Practically all of 
the Supreme Court's opinion in the Miner case is contrary 
to the position of plaintiff's attorneys. At page 91 of the 
Utah citation the Court said 
"Once a decision has been rendered against an 
applicant on an issue of fact, his right to a rehearing 
for the production of further evidence is within the 
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discretion of the Commission. Ordinarily the Com-
mission does not abuse its discretion when it refuses 
to open up a case for the taking of further evidence, 
particularly when the tendered evidence would not 
compel a contrary finding." 
Plaintiff's attorneys' brief (page 12) refers to the case 
of Jensen vs. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 Pac. (2nd) 708, 
and quotes a sentence from the Supreme Court's opinion, 
relating to a trial court's refusal to grant a new trial. 
We doubt that this Court is now ready to hold that all 
rules relating to motion for new trial in District Court cases 
shall apply to the Industrial Commission's action relating 
to applications for rehearings. Regardless of that point, 
we call the Court's attention to a sentence preceding the 
sentence quoted by plaintiff's attorneys at 89 Utah 380, to 
wit 
"Where disinterested testimony on the vital 
point in a case is very scant, newly discovered testi-
mony on that point appearing from affidavits in 
support of the motion for a new trial to be appar-
ently reliable, when it appears that the movant for 
the new trial was not guilty of indiligence in failing 
to obtain the witness for the trial, and there is no 
element of holding such witness in reserve for pur-
poses of obtaining a new trial-generally pictur-
esquely denominated in slang phraseology as "an 
ace in the hole"-and it appears likely that such 
evidence would change the result, a new trial should 
be granted." 
Morgan vs. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 82 L. Ed. 1129, 
was cited by plaintiff's attorneys at page 15 of their brief. 
An examination of the questions decided by the United 
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States Supreme Court in that case, shows very little simi-
larity to the points involved in the case at bar. Syllabus 
number 2 of the Morgan case discloses the type of question 
therein involved: 
"2. The 'full hearing' upon which the Packers 
and Stockyards Act conditions the power of the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to fix maximum rates to be 
charged by market agencies at stockyards requires 
that the agencies under investigation be fairly ad-
vised of what the government proposes and be heard 
upon its proposals before it issues its final command, 
even where the proceeding is not of an adversary 
character but is initiated as a general inquiry." 
CONCLUSION 
Neither we nor the members of the Industrial Com-
mission receive any personal pleasure in being required to 
refuse or oppose the request of a seriously injured man for 
financial assistance. The Legislature enacted the Work-
men's Compensation Act, providing for financial benefits 
to covered employees under specified circumstances. Re-
gardless of how generous the Industrial Commissioners or 
any others may feel, they cannot legally go beyond the limi-
tations set by the Legislature. 
For the foregoing reasons the Decision and Order of 
the Industrial Commission should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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